|Perryville, Kentucky October, 1862
Source: Official Record, Vol XVI, I,
HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE OHIO,
Perryville, October 9, 1862.
I have already advised you of the movement of the army under my command from Louisville. More or
less skirmishing has occurred daily with the enemy's cavalry since then. It was supposed the enemy
would give battle at Bardstown. The troops reached that point on the 4th, driving out the enemy's rear
guard of cavalry and artillery. The main body retired toward Springfield, whither the pursuit has
continued. The center corps, under General Gilbert, moved on the direct road from Springfield to
Perryville, and arrived on the 7th within 2 miles of the town, where the enemy was found to be in force.
The left column, under General McCook, came up on the Mackville road about 10 o'clock yesterday,
the 8th. It was ordered into position to attack and a strong reconnaissance directed.
At 4 o'clock I received a request from General McCook for re-enforcements, and heard with
astonishment that the left had been seriously engaged for several hours and that the right and left of that
corps were being turned and severally pressed Re-enforcements were immediately sent forward from
the center; orders were also sent to the right column, under General Crittenden, which was advancing
by the Lebanon road, to push forward and attack the enemy's left, but it was impossible for it to get
into position in time to produce any decided results. The action continued until dark; some sharp
fighting also occurred in the center. The enemy was everywhere repulsed, but not without some
momentary advantage on the left.
The several corps were put in position during the night and moved to attack; at 6 o'clock this morning
some skirmishing occurred with the enemy's rear guard. The main body has fallen back in the direction
of Harrodsburg. I have no accurate report of our loss yet. It is probably pretty heavy, including
valuable officers. Generals Jackson and Terrill, I regret to say, are among the number of killed. I will
report more in detail as soon as possible.
LOUISVILLE, KY., November 4, 1862.
SIR: It is due to the army which I have commanded for the last twelve months, and perhaps due to
myself, that I should make a circumstantial report of its operations during the past summer. Such a
report requires data not now at hand, and would occupy more time than can be spared at present from
the subject of more immediate interest, namely, the operations from Louisville against the rebel forces
in Kentucky under the command of General Bragg. I therefore commence this report from that period
premising only, in a general way that my attention to the condition of affairs in Kentucky was
demanded, first, by the minor operations of the enemy, which by the destruction of the railroad had
completely severed the communications of my army and left it at a distance of 300 miles from its base
with very limited supplies; and, second, by the formidable invasion, which not only threatened the
permanent occupation of the State, but exposed the States north of the Ohio River to invasion.
Leaving a sufficient force to hold Nashville, the remainder of the army under my command was put in
march for Kentucky. The rear division left Nashville on the 15th and arrived at Louisville, a distance of
170 miles, on September 29. The advance arrived on the 25th. The particulars of the march will, as I
have said, be given in a subsequent report, in connection with other matters.
I found in and about the city a considerable force of raw troops, hurriedly thrown in from Illinois,
Indiana, and Ohio, for the defense of the city against the formidable force that had invaded the State
under Generals Bragg and Kirby Smith. Under the command of Major-General Nelson, whose
untimely death cannot be too much deplored, these troops had been organized into brigades and
divisions, and they had some able and experienced officers in Generals Boyle, Jackson, Cruft, Gilbert,
Terrill, and others. But the troops were as yet undisciplined, unprovided with suitable artillery, and in
every way unfit for active operations against a disciplined foe. It was necessary to reorganize the
whole force. This was done as far as possible by intermixing the new troops with the old without
changing the old organization. The troops were supplied with shoes and other essentials, of which they
were greatly in need; among them certain light cooking utensils, which the men could carry, and
dispense with wagons, the allowance of which was reduced to one for each regiment, to carry a few
necessary articles for officers and one for hospital supplies, besides the ambulances.
The army was to have marched on September 30, but an order, which was subsequently suspended,
relieving me from the command delayed the movement until the following day.
The army marched on the 1st ultimo in five columns. The left moved toward Frankfort, to hold in check
the force the enemy which still remained at or near that place; the other columns, marching by different
routes, finally fell respectively into the roads leading from Shepherdsville, Mount Washington, Fairfield,
and Bloomfield to Bardstown, where the main force of the enemy under General Bragg was known to
be. These roads converge upon Bardstown at an angle of about 15Â° from each other.
Skirmishing with the enemy's cavalry and artillery marked the movement of each column from within a
few miles of Louisville. It was more stubborn and formidable near Bardstown; but the rear of the
enemy's infantry retired from that place eight hours before our arrival, when his rear guard of cavalry
and artillery retreated after a sharp engagement with my cavalry. The pursuit and skirmishing with the
enemy's rear guard continued toward Springfield.
The information which I received indicated that the enemy would concentrate his forces at Danville.
The First Corps, under Major-General McCook, was therefore ordered to march from Bloomfield on
Harrodsburg, while the Second Corps, under Major-General Crittenden, moved on the Lebanon and
Danville road, which passes 4 miles to the south of Perryville, with a branch to the latter place, and the
Third Corps on the direct road to Perryville. My headquarters moved with the Third (or center) Corps.
Major-General Thomas, second in command, accompanied the Second (or right) Corps. After leaving
Bardstown I learned that the force of Kirby Smith had crossed to the west side of the Kentucky River
near Salvisa, and that the enemy was moving to concentrate either at Harrodsburg or Perryville.
General McCook's route was therefore changed from Harrodsburg to Perryville.
The center corps arrived on the afternoon of the 7th, and was drawn up in order of battle about 3 miles
from Perryville, where the enemy appeared to be in force. The advance guard, under Captain Gay,
consisting of cavalry and artillery, supported toward evening by two regiments of infantry, pressed
successfully upon the enemy's rear guard to within 2 miles of the town against a somewhat stubborn
The whole army had for three days or more suffered from a scarcity of water. The last day particularly
the troops and animals suffered exceedingly for the want of it and from hot weather and dusty roads. In
the bed of Doctor's Creek, a tributary of Chaplin River, about 2Â½ miles from Perryville, some pools
of water were discovered, which the enemy showed a determination to prevent us from gaining
possession of. The Thirty-sixth brigade, under the command of Col. Daniel McCook, from General
Sheridan's division was ordered forward to seize and hold a commanding position which covered these
pools. It executed the orders that night, and a supply of bad water was secured for the troops.
On discovering that the enemy was concentrating for battle at Perryville I sent orders on the night of the
7th to General McCook and General Crittenden to march at 3 o'clock the following morning, so as to
take position respectively as early as possible on the right and left of the center corps, the commanders
themselves to report in person for orders on their arrival, my intention being to make the attack that
day if possible. The orders did not reach General McCook until 2.30 o'clock, and he marched at 5.
The Second Corps, failing to find water at the place where it was expected to encamp the night of the
7th, had to move off the road for that purpose, and consequently was some 6 miles or more farther off
than it would otherwise have been. The orders did not reach it in time, and these two causes delayed
its arrival several hours. Still it was far enough advanced to have been pressed into the action on the
8th if the necessity for it had been known early enough.
The engagement which terminated at night the previous day was renewed early on the morning of the
8th by an attempt of the enemy to drive the brigade of Colonel McCook from the position taken to
cover the water in Doctor's Creek. The design had been discovered, and the divisions of Generals
Mitchell and Sheridan were moved into position to defeat it and hold the ground until the army was
prepared to attack in force. A spirited attack was made on Colonel McCook's position and was
Between 10 and 11 o'clock the left corps arrived on the Mackville road. General McCook was
instructed to get it promptly into position on the left of the center corps and to make a reconnaissance
to his front and left. The reconnaissance had been continued by Captain Gay toward his front and right,
and sharp firing with artillery was then going on. I had somewhat expected an attack early in the
morning on Gilbert's corps while it was isolated; but, as it did not take place, no formidable attack was
apprehended after the arrival of the left corps.
The disposition of the troops was made mainly with a view to a combined attack on the enemy's
position at daylight the following morning, as the time required to get all the troops into position after
the unexpected delay would probably make it too late to attack that day.
The cannonading, which commenced with the partial engagement in the center, followed by the
reconnaissance of the cavalry, under Captain Gay, extended toward the left, and became brisker as the
day advanced but was not supposed to proceed from any serious engagement, as no report to that
effect was received.
At 4 o'clock, however, Major-General McCook's aide-de-camp arrived and reported to me that the
general was sustaining a severe attack, which he would not be able to withstand unless re-enforced;
that his flanks were already giving way. He added, to my astonishment, that the left corps had actually
been engaged in a severe battle for several hours, perhaps since 12 o'clock. It was so difficult to credit
the latter that I thought there must even be some misapprehension in regard to the former. I sent word
to him that I should rely on his being able to hold his ground, though I should probably send him
re-enforcements. I at once sent orders for two brigades from the center corps (Schoepf's division) to
move promptly to re-enforce the left. Orders were also sent to General Crittenden to move a division
in to strengthen the center and to move with the rest of his corps energetically against the enemy's left
flank. The distance from one flank of the army to the other was not perhaps less than 6 miles, and
before the orders could be delivered and the right corps make the attack night came on and terminated
The roads going from Mackville and Springfield enter Perryville at an angle of about 15Â° with each
other. The road from Lebanon runs nearly parallel to the Springfield road to within 5 miles of Perryville
and then forks, the left-hand fork going to Perryville and the right continuing straight on to Danville,
leaving Perryville 4 miles to the north. There is' also a direct road from Perryville to Danville. Perryville,
Danville, and Harrodsburg occupy the vertices of an equilateral triangle, and are 10 miles apart. Salt
River rises midway between Perryville and Danville, and runs northward 2 miles west of Harrodsburg.
Chaplin Fork rises near and passes through Perryville, bending in its course so as to run obliquely away
from the Mackville and Perryville road, on which the left corps advanced. Doctor's Creek, running
north, crossed the Perryville and Springfield roads at right angles about 2Â½ miles west of Perryville,
and empties into Chaplin Fork about 3 miles from town. The ground bordering the Chaplin is hilly, with
alternate patches of timber and cleared land. The hills, though in some places steep, are generally
practicable for infantry and cavalry and in many places for artillery.
The ground afforded the enemy great advantages for attacking a force on the Mackville road, taken in
the act of forming, as was the case in the battle of the 8th. General McCook's line ran nearly parallel
with Chaplin Fork, the right resting on the road and the left to the north of it. Two of General
Rousseau's brigades(the Seventeenth, under Colonel Lytle, and the Ninth, under Colonel Harris) were
on the right: then the Thirty-third Brigade, under General Terrill, of Jackson's division, then on the
extreme left and to the rear of Terrill the Twenty-eighth Brigade, under Colonel Starkweather, of
Rousseau's division. The other brigade of Jackson's division, under Colonel Webster, was at first in the
rear of Rousseau's two right brigades, and in the course of the battle was brought into action on the
right. General Gilbert's corps was on the right of Rousseau, but the space between them was
somewhat too great--first, Sheridan's division, then Mitchell's, and Schoepf's in reserve opposite the
left of the corps.
The fight commenced early in the day, as has been described, with a feeble attack on the center corps;
then, later, the attack fell with severity and pertinacity on Rousseau's right brigades; then, somewhat
later, on Terrill's brigade, and on Rousseau's third brigade on the extreme left. It was successful against
Terrill's brigade, composed of new regiments.
The gallant commander of the division, General J. S. Jackson, was killed almost instantly. The heroic
young brigadier, Terrill, lost his life in endeavoring to rally his troops and ten pieces of his artillery were
left on the ground. Two of them were carried off by the enemy the next morning; the rest were
The main weight of the battle thus fell upon the Third Division, under General Rousseau. No troops
could have met it with more heroism. The left brigade, compelled at first to fall back somewhat, at
length maintained its ground and repulsed the attack at that point.
Taking advantage of the opening between Gilbert's left and Rousseau's right, the enemy pressed his
attack at that point with an overwhelming force. Rousseau's right was being turned and was forced to
fall back, which it did in excellent order, until re-enforced by Gooding's and Steedman's brigades from
Gilbert's corps, when the enemy was repulsed. That result was also promoted by the fire which the
artillery of Sheridan's division poured into the enemy's left flank. Simultaneously with the heaviest attack
on Rousseau's division the enemy made a strong attack on Sheridan's right. Sheridan was re-enforced
from Mitchell's division by Colonel Carlin's brigade, which charged the enemy with intrepidity and
drove him through the town to his position beyond, capturing in the town 2 caissons and 15 wagons,
loaded with ammunition, and the guard that was with them, consisting of 3 officers and 138 men. This
occurred about night-fall, which terminated the battle.
The corps of General Crittenden closed in, and Wagner's brigade, of Wood's division,
became engaged and did good service on the right of Mitchell's division, but knowing nothing
of the severity of the fight on the extreme left the rest of the corps did not get into action.
No doubt was entertained that the enemy would endeavor to hold his position. Accordingly orders
were sent to the commanders of corps to be prepared to attack at daylight in the morning. They
received instructions in person at my headquarters that night, except General Crittenden, for whom
instructions were given to Major-General Thomas, second in command. General McCook supposed,
from indications in his front, that the enemy would throw a formidable force against his corps, in
pursuance of the original attempt to turn our left. He represented also that his corps was very much
crippled, the new division of General Jackson having in fact almost entirely disappeared as a body. He
was instructed to move in during the night and close the opening between his right and General Gilbert's
left. His orders for the following day were to hold his position, taking advantage of any opportunity that
the events of the day might present. The corps of Generals Crittenden and Gilbert were to move
forward at 6 o'clock and attack the enemy's front and left flank.
The advance the following morning, in pursuance of these orders, discovered that the enemy's main
body had retired during the night, but without any indications of haste or disorder, except that his dead
and many of his wounded were left upon the field. The reconnaissance during the day showed that his
whole force had fallen back on Harrodsburg, where the indications seemed to be that he would make a
It will be impossible to form any correct judgment of the operations from this time, particularly without
considering the condition of the two armies and the probable intentions of the enemy. The rebel army
has been driven from the borders of Kentucky without a decisive battle. It is spoken of as if it were a
comparatively insignificant force and pursued by an overwhelming one, which had nothing to do but to
send out patrols and gather in the fragments of a routed and disorganized army. The very reverse was
the ease. The rebel force which invaded Kentucky, at the lowest estimates, has been rated at from
55,000 to 65,000 men. It was composed of veteran troops, well armed, and thoroughly inured to
hardships. Every circumstance of its march and the concurrent testimony of all who came within reach
of its lines attest that it was under perfect discipline.
It had entered Kentucky with the avowed purpose of holding the State; its commanders declared that
to be their intention to the last. Intercepted communications, disclosing their plans and the
disappointment expressed by the Southern press at the result, show that to have been their purpose.
The enterprise certainly seemed desperate, but it was entered upon deliberately, was conducted by the
best talent in the rebel service, and there was nothing to indicate that it would be abandoned lightly.
Some maneuvering for advantage and one decisive battle were to be expected before Kentucky could
be rid of her invader. Everything goes to show that the final retreat of the enemy was suddenly
determined on, and that it was not at the time to be calculated upon as a matter of course. Any
movement on my part, solely in anticipation of it, would only have turned the enemy in a different
direction, and any presumptuous attempt to capture a superior force by detachments would, according
to all probabilities, have been more likely to result in defeat than in success.
The effective force which advanced on Perryville on the 7th and 8th under my command was about
58,000 infantry, artillery, and cavalry. Of these about 22,000 were raw troops, with very little
instruction, or none at all. The reports show an actual loss of upward of 4,000 killed, wounded, and
missing in the battle, which would leave the effective force about 54,000 after it. I did not hesitate
therefore, after crossing Chaplin River and finding the enemy had fallen back, to await the arrival of
General Sill's division, which had marched to Frankfort, and had been ordered to join, via
Lawrenceburg and Chaplintown, when it was ascertained that Kirby Smith's force had marched to
form a junction with Bragg. That division on the march from Louisville encountered a strong outpost of
the enemy on the Frankfort road about 12 miles out, and skirmishing was kept up until its arrival at
Frankfort. It was followed closely by the division of General Dumont which remained at Frankfort.
In marching from Frankfort to join the main body Sill's division was attacked near Lawrenceburg by a
portion of Kirby Smith's force, which it drove off, and then continued its march, arriving at Perryville on
the evening of the 11th. Pending its arrival the army took position, with its right 4 miles from Danville,
its center on the Perryville and Harrodsburg pike, and the left near Dicksville, on roads converging on
On the 11th three brigades from Crittenden's and Gilbert's corps, with Gay's and Colonel McCook's
cavalry brigades, were sent out to reconnoiter the enemy's position. He was found in some force 2
miles south of Harrodsburg in the morning, but retired during the day, and his rear guard was driven out
in the evening, with the loss of some stores and about 1,200 prisoners, mostly sick and wounded. It
was probable that he would retire his whole force to Camp Dick Robinson, though it was not certainly
ascertained what portion of it had crossed Dick's River. To compel him to take at once one side or the
other, and either give battle on this side or be prevented from recrossing to attack our communications
when a move was made to turn his position, the left corps moved on the 12th to Harrodsburg (General
Sill's division having arrived the night before), the right corps moving forward and resting near and to
the left of Danville, and the center midway on the Danville and Harrodsburg road, while a strong
reconnaissance was sent forward to the crossing of Dick's River. The enemy was found to have
crossed with his whole force.
The ground between the Kentucky River and Dick's River, as a military position, is rendered almost
impregnable on the north and west by the rocky cliffs which border those streams, and which are only
passable at a few points easily defended. Such is the character of Dick's River from its mouth to where
the Danville and Lexington road crosses it, a distance of about 12 miles. It could only be reached by
turning it to the south, while the passes to the west, by which our lines of communication would be
exposed, were suitably guarded. The army was moving with that view, when I learned, on the evening
of the 13th, at Danville, that the enemy was retiring from his position toward the south. Pursuit was
immediately ordered for the purpose of overtaking or intercepting him if he should attempt to pass
General Wood's division marched at 12 o'clock that night, and engaged the enemy's cavalry and
artillery at Stanford at daylight the next morning. The remainder of General Crittenden's corps and
General McCook's corps followed on that road and General Gilbert's marched on the Lancaster road.
The enemy kept the road toward Cumberland Gap, opposing with cavalry and artillery the advance of
both of the pursuing columns, which, however, progressed steadily.
At Crab Orchard the character of the country suddenly changes. It becomes rough and barren,
affording scarcely more than enough corn for its sparse population, and the road passes through
defiles, where a small force can resist with great effect a large one; where in fact the use of a large
force is impracticable. The little forage the country afforded was consumed by the enemy in his retreat,
rendering it impossible to subsist any considerable number of animals. The corps of General McCook
and General Gilbert were therefore halted at Crab Orchard, while that of General Crittenden, with
General W. S. Smith's division in advance, continued the pursuit as far as London on the direct road
and on the branch road to Manchester.
I have not received the formal report of the operations of this corps, but the pursuit was conducted by
its commander, according to my orders, with judgment and energy. The road was cleared of the trees
felled across it by the enemy and his rear guard attacked successfully at several points. Some prisoners
were taken, and about 300 head of cattle and other property, to no very great amount captured.
It was not expedient to continue the pursuit beyond London, partly because it was impracticable in a
manner to afford any material advantage; partly because, without advantage, it took the troops out of
the way when they were likely to be required elsewhere. They were therefore promptly turned upon
other routes toward Tennessee. A portion were to be at Bowling Green and the rest at Glasgow on the
31st ultimo, and thence continue their march by certain routes.
In that position I relinquished the command of the army on the 30th to Major-General Rosecrans, in
obedience to instructions from the general-in-chief. In the mean time the railroads, which had been
broken up by the enemy and suspended for two months, had been repaired as far as Bowling Green to
carry forward supplies.
I have no means at this time of reporting the casualties that occurred in the minor engagements or
skirmishes that took place during the campaign, nor is it possible for me to do justice to the services of
the officers and soldiers engaged in them, as the subsequent movements of the troops and my
separation from them have prevented me from obtaining detailed reports, except concerning the battle
of the 8th. The particulars referred to outside of the battle are based on the brief and sometimes oral
reports made at the time, and are unavoidably less complete and definite than I could wish. For the
same reason many such I am unable to mention at all. In regard to the battle of the 8th, the reports of
the several commanders go much more into detail than is necessary in this report, and I beg leave to
commend them to your consideration especially in relation to the services of many officers whose
names are not herein mentioned. Where I have mentioned troops by the name of their commander,
unless otherwise expressed, I wish to be understood as commending him for their good conduct.
The daily services of officers in an active campaign, though less brilliant, are often more arduous and
important than those of the battlefield, and in this respect also the commanders of corps,
Major-General McCook, Major-General Crittenden, and Brigadier-General Gilbert, are entitled to my
thanks and the approbation of the Government. This commendation should extend also to many other
officers in proportion to their responsibilities, particularly to the commanders of divisions.
I am indebted in the highest degree to the members of my staff for their assistance, especially to my
chief of staff, Col. James B. Fry, whose efficient aid I have had during the whole period of my
command in Kentucky and Tennessee.
The difficult and responsible duty of supplying a large force by wagon transportation over a line of
about 140 miles was ably performed by Capt. J. G. Chandler, chief quartermaster, and Capt. Francis
Darr, chief commissary.
Capt. H. C. Bankhead, acting inspector-general; Capt. J. H. Gilman, chief of artillery and acting
ordnance officer, and Capt. N. Miehler, Topographical Engineers, discharged their duties in the most
satisfactory manner. At Perryville they were active and useful in reconnoitering the ground with a view
to posting troops for battle.
Maj. J. M. Wright, assistant adjutant-general; Lieut. C. L. Fitzhugh, aide-de-camp, and Lieut. T. J.
Bush, aide-de-camp, conveyed my orders to different commanders during the 8th, and at all times
performed their duties with intelligence and zeal. The duties of his office have been ably and faithfully
performed by Surg. Robert Murray, medical director.
The intelligent officers of the Signal Corps, Capt. Jesse Merrill and Lieutenants Meeker, Sheridan, and
Fitch, attached to my headquarters, rendered good service at Perryville and other points.
Private Oakford, of the Anderson Troop, in carrying orders late on the evening of the 8th, fell into the
enemy's lines and was captured, but had the presence of mind to destroy his dispatches.
I cannot omit to make honorable mention of the Michigan regiment of Mechanics and Engineers. It has
not only rendered invaluable service in its appropriate duties during the past year, but at Chaplin Hills
and on other occasions it has, in whole or in part, gallantly engaged the enemy. I especially commend
Colonel Innes, Lieutenant-Colonel Hunton, and Major Hopkins for the efficient services of this fine
The cavalry, under Col. John Kennett, Fourth Ohio, commanding a division; Col. Lewis Zahm, Third
Ohio, commanding a brigade; Col. E. M. McCook, Second Indiana, commanding a brigade, and
Capt. E. Gay, commanding a brigade, rendered excellent service.
The brigade of Captain Gay was conducted with gallantry and effect by that officer at Perryville on the
7th and 8th.
The other brigades were not in the battle, but came in contact with the enemy on other occasions
during the campaign. When the army marched on Louisville they were left on the south side of Salt
River, under the command of Colonel Kennett, to escort the train of the army from Bowling Green and
watch the enemy in the direction of Bardstown. The train was conducted in the most successful manner
by Colonel Zahm.
The brigade of Colonel McCook also acquitted itself in the most satisfactory manner. A portion of it,
under Lieut Col R. R. Stewart, captured Colonel Crawford and the principal part of his regiment of
Georgia cavalry near New Haven on September 29.
Colonel Kennett, with Colonel McCook's brigade, rejoined the army at Bardstown on the 5th. Colonel
Zahm's marched across from the mouth of the Salt River to join the column at Frankfort and thence to
the main body at Danville.
The campaign, the history of which I have sketched, occupied a period of about twenty days. The
result can be stated in a few words: An army, prepared for the conquest and occupation of Kentucky,
with full knowledge of our means of resistance and with a confident expectation of prevailing over
them, has been driven back, baffled and dispirited, from the borders of the State. It is true that only
one serious battle has been fought, and that was incomplete and less decisive than it ought to have
been. That it was so is due partly to unavoidable difficulties, which prevented the troops, marching on
different roads, from getting upon the ground simultaneously; but more to the fact that I was not
apprised early enough of the condition of affairs on my left. I can find no fault with the former, nor am I
disposed at this time to censure the latter, though it must be admitted to have been a grave error. I
ascribe it to the too great confidence of the general commanding the left corps (Major-General
McCook), which made him believe that he could manage the difficulty without the aid or control of his
commander. As before stated, there was skirmishing along the whole front, but after a certain hour, for
the reasons stated, no general engagement was anticipated that day, and no sound of musketry reached
my headquarters by which the sharpness of the action on the left could be known or even suspected,
and when the fact was ascertained it was too late to do more than throw in succor before night set in.
But although this lack of information was attended with disappointment and unfortunate consequences,
yet the unequal struggle was marked by no disaster and conspicuously displayed the courage and
discipline of the troops.
From first to last I suppose 4,000 or 5,000 prisoners, sick, wounded, and well, were taken; and at
various points some stores and property fell into our hands, among them 2,500 barrels of pork and
two pieces of cannon, abandoned by the enemy at Camp Dick Robinson. I do not believe that he
carried off in his retreat any large amount of stores. He may have sent off a good deal, from first to last,
while he was in quiet occupation of so much of the State.
The reports show a loss of 916 killed, 2,943 wounded, and 489 missing. Total, 4,348 in the battle of
the 8th. It includes many valuable lives. The loss of such men as James S. Jackson, William R. Terrill,
George P. Jouett, George Webster, W. P. Campbell, Alexander S. Berryhill, and John Herrell would
be mourned in any army and any cause where true manliness and earnest devotion are appreciated.
I inclose herewith the reports of subordinate commanders as far as received and a map showing the
lines of operation of the army.
Major-General Thomas acted as second in command during the campaign, and I am indebted to him
for the most valuable assistance.
Very respectfully, your obedient servant,
D. C. BUELL,
General LORENZO THOMAS,
Adjutant-General U.S. Army, Washington, D. C.
GENERAL ORDERS No. 47b.
HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE OHIO
October 12, 1862.
The battle of Chaplin Hills, fought near Perryville on the 8th instant will stand conspicuous for its
severity in the history of the rebellion. It deserves to be commemorated for the determined valor
displayed by the portion of the army that was engaged.
The principal force of the enemy, on chosen ground, under General Bragg, attacked our left wing as it
was moving into position after a fatiguing march. The suddenness and strength of the attack, and the fall
of two of their gallant leaders, Jackson and Terrill, caused some of the new troops of the Tenth
Division to fall into disorder, and threw the weight of the battle mainly on the Third Division. This was
subsequently re-enforced by two brigades from the center corps, which itself had met with
considerable opposition in moving into position. The enemy was repulsed with heavy loss, and when
the army advanced to the attack at 6 o'clock the following morning was found to have retreated during
The good conduct exhibited by the troops on this field only realized that which the general has always
confidently expected from them. Fortuitous circumstances, which so often affect the incidents of war
screened the enemy from a combined effort of the different corps until night intervened to prevent his
defeat from terminating in the destruction of his army, but the thanks of the general are not less due to
the gallant officers and men under his command. In the battle and on the march the old troops have
given the highest proofs of discipline and courage. The new troops already vie with them. Let them
preserve order, remembering that lawlessness in an army is both disgraceful and fatal. The sacredness
and dignity of the cause for which they are battling demand nothing less. The nation will mourn the loss
of the heroes who fell at Chaplin Hills; it will honor those who prove worthy to fib their places.
By command of Major-General Buell:
JAMES B. FRY,
Colonel and Chief of Staff
Perryville Location Photos